Hi all, this essay is one that I quite enjoyed writing and wanted to share - as it integrates some things I am interested in. I hope you enjoy it,

The history of colonialism provides sufficient evidence to show that the concept of sovereignty is not enough to account for the extensive role of non-state actors within the period from 1500 to 1950. However, this does not imply sovereignty is a myth. Instead, sovereignty effectively maps the rights, rules and norms that apply to states at several important historical junctures, notably in the mid-20th Century. Sovereignty reflects a truth – that significant power can reside in states that mutually respect one another’s’ rights. However, ideas rarely reflect universal reality – all but the most basic require ham-fisted universalisation of bare historically contingencies. Sovereignty – and its totalising claims – is no different.

Several strong challenges to sovereignty can be rooted in the history of colonialism. Potentially the most common is that sovereignty only provides formal sovereignty and not real power – ‘positive sovereignty’ – to states that do not occupy predominant positions in a world order. In this view, the western concept of sovereignty is a mask and a myth – power relations are obscured behind the theoretical claim that all have an equal right to political agency. Grovogui uses the example of support by strong western powers for weak western states – namely Switzerland and Belgium – and contrasts it with colonial and post-colonial treatment of the DRC. Western attitudes towards Africa enabled the facilitation of disorder and the systematic dismemberment of ability to exercise control on the ground – strong links can be drawn between insurrection in Katanga and the continued existence of Belgian mining companies in the region. An alternative framework for a similar argument is Stephen Krasner’s concept of ‘organised hypocrisy’. For Krasner, the principle of sovereignty, like any other international norm, is weak. The incentives to act for domestic political advantage are always strong, because domestic actors tend to require constant domestic legitimation. As a result, material advantage will always trump international ‘logics of appropriateness’ – and so sovereignty becomes meaningless. It is clear there is some parallel here with Schmittian exceptionalism. The world of sovereign states approximates a state that guarantees ‘rights’ to individuals. For Schmitt, the guarantee is not useful as when it matters, said guarantee is likely to break down. When sovereign states are in conflict with more powerful actors, the powerful are likely to use dirty tricks and disregard self-imposed norms. Krasner cites east Asia in the 19th Century. Britain wanted a pliant China – as it needed access to trade without the costs of administration. It therefore invented new concepts outside the bounds of sovereignty so that its interests could be better met. The ‘unequal treaties’ provide for treaty ports which exist between the state and the sub-state. The claim is clear – dominant states have no obligation to abide by norms of sovereignty, and the history of colonialism shows they rarely do.

Although there is significant truth in these set of related arguments, their scope is far more limited than first made out. The arguments stake out too great a role for the state – overlooking how states exist as a composite hotchpotch of various non-state actors. The history of colonialism should be seen as a dialogue between various non-state actors and reactive – often passive - states. It is the decisive influence of non-state actors in deciding the direction and flavour of colonialism that best show sovereignty’s weaknesses. The first limitation of the Krasner-Grovogui-Schmitt argument is that it only makes sense if ‘sovereignty’ is a well-understood, fully developed norm. If western colonial powers are to be hypocritical, they must have principles that they are failing to live up to. Although at certain historical colonial moments sovereign equality was a strong norm, other concepts of world order are stronger at others. It is no contradiction, just a moral travesty, for European states to believe certain state-like actors are less civilized, and so do not require equal treatment. Randolph Churchill’s invasion of Burma in 1886 was not a moment of hypocrisy – in the 1880s, the artificial division between the ‘civilised’ and ‘uncivilised’ was broadly accepted by Europeans. In fact, Churchill was proud of his conquest – he used it as both propaganda and a career tool by bestowing it as a ‘present’ to Victoria. A second criticism of the Krasner-Grovogui-Schmitt argument is noting how exceptional states of exception are. States of exception require significant and specific grievances and often result from the fairly random internal dynamics of global powers.  They also require high degrees of hegemonic power for real chance of success. This is best illustrated by the relationship between 1950s Egypt, the USA and Britain. Britain could not decisively impact decisions made by the Egyptian government when it nationalised the Suez Canal despite its greater relative power, its strong Mediterranean naval presence and its diplomatic and military ties to the local region. As a result, it had to create a state of exception – disregarding self-imposed norms to retake the Canal. That it went about doing so was not inevitable – and partly a result of the psychological deficiencies of Eden. This is telling – Britain, a dominant colonial power, needed personal, structural and political factors to align for it to be conceivable to retake the vital strategic asset. Even more telling is that the whole venture failed. Nasser was able to play the USA against Britain. Without hegemony, there is no guarantee that other powers won’t support the cause of the aggrieved – using the legitimacy afforded by shared global norms to their advantage.

The final criticism of the Krasner-Grovogui-Schmitt hypothesis is the strongest – namely the extent of the role of non-state actors during the colonial period. In fact, this provides an effective counter-framework to understand the real problems with ‘sovereignty’. Krasner is right that states’ domestic interests often subsume international norms. However, Krasner takes the wrong lessons from this insight. Instead of regularly dominating others, under Krasner’s conditions states turn inwards and become reactive, rather than proactive, machines. At key junctures from 1500 to 1950, non-state actors – or actors only loosely affiliated with the state – pushed states to react. Sovereignty is not the full story in this context. An illuminating example is the British East India Company. Although often supported tacitly by the state and subject to Parliamentary statute and oversight – before 1859 it was never state-controlled. In fact, expansion of both British and French influence in India in the mid-18th Century occurred through private companies. Individuals, notably Robert Clive, forged European power for the sake of personal and financial aggrandisement and did so with little state aid. Although some elements of the British state clearly benefitted from the enormous wealth brought in by the company, no British official set out a clear plan to dominate India at any one time. Instead, the British attitude can be better described as one of ambiguous and shiftable targets possessed by a multitude of actors in a highly composite state. Some sub-state agents were highly critical of the Raj - hence the near-impeachment of former Governor-General Warren Hastings and the strong resentment against the buying of rotten boroughs by the company. Further to, when the British Raj was established in 1859, it was again a highly reactive move. Without the experience of the 1857 mutiny, the British state would have been unwilling to take on such responsibility for such little benefit. That this story is repeated elsewhere is very telling. The Dutch East India Company (VOC) has a similar story of expansion as a private company, increasing territorial expansion and eventual integration into the state. Non-state actors were not limited to this form of commercial colonialism. In fact, only a very limited number of colonial exchanges can be explained outside of this context. The development of North American settler colonies, for example, was an organic process that was not often instigated by the state. Some British American colonies existed to provide havens for religious evangelicals – the Quaker state of Pennsylvania provides an example. Other reasons for migration to the new world included opportunities to amass wealth or desperation resulting from famine. None of these motivations are directed by or for the state. Even late 19th Century colonialism – typified by the Berlin Conference – had significant input by non-state actors. Randolph Churchill’s role in Burma shows that a rogue government minister could often direct state action for the sake of self-promotion. Here, we see a myth – but one that does not relate to the theoretical existence of sovereignty. Instead, the myth of state-led colonialism means sovereignty does not apply to a certain form of international relations. In essence, when non-state actors are strong, states have internal disagreement about the meaning of self-interest and there exists strong incentives for inter-state exchange, sovereignty is weak. This is the case in colonial interactions from 1500 to 1900.

A reading of Hegel and the context of how and where the concept of ‘sovereignty’ arose shows why sovereignty nevertheless can be a useful tool, despite clear deficiencies. Hegel, in his lectures on the ‘Philosophy of History’, argues a model of directional history that defines ideas as partial snapshots. Like a photograph, they necessarily contain an element of truth – but like a photograph, they can’t capture the whole of a moment. The need to understand requires focus, which requires exclusion of information. This explains why narratives that seem compelling in a specific historical moment often fall flat after relatively historically insignificant periods of time. Sovereignty can be explained through this framework. ‘Sovereignty’ as a concept has a long history – but fascination with it as an explanation for political trends and actions is located among realist and liberal thinkers of the 1950s. There are clear reasons why. States in this period acted more like cohesive units – reflection upon international relations would therefore be more state-centric. States were usually self-contained entities – the firms that produced the most valuable products tended to exist within the locale of a specific state. Susan Strange highlights this by drawing on the comparative of later 20th Century non-state industry. Similarly, reaction against formal western domination often encouraged insularity in many former colonies. Mao’s China, Nehru’s India, Castro’s Cuba and Nasser’s Egypt all provide examples of states closing out external influences. In this context, international non-state actors have fewer opportunities for leverage. From the 1930s, ideological competition also hardened minds – a ‘national interest’ became increasingly homogenous and discernible. Soviet Communism acted as a tool for ‘othering’ western state interests. In contrast, British interests in the 18th and 19th Century were various and allowed for significant diplomatic flexibility. This matters because under the conditions of ideological threat, states act with greater homogeneity – the internal mechanisms of the state do not conflict as much, and therefore it makes sense to think of states as units. In the mid-20th Century, sovereignty made a lot of sense as a means of understanding states. Even though, therefore, sovereignty is limited when understanding colonial-era relations – it is still vital. It is not a myth.

In conclusion, truth can only be reached through a conversation between different perspectives that capture unique elements of perceived reality. In this context, what we might describe as ‘sovereignty’ has a place in all moments of history – it reflects core elements and tendencies of human nature. It cannot be avoided. However, it also cannot be universalised. Non-state actors provide just as good an explanation for action in international relations in the colonial period as state sovereignty does in the mid-20th Century. ‘Sovereignty’ fails because it attempts to ensnare human behaviour and display it in a glass cabinet. The complexities of human nature are far too deep and varied for language to grasp without error. Sovereignty is therefore neither myth nor reality – it is a concept, and so occupies the hinterland between.

BIBLIOGRAPHY:

Dalrymple, ‘The East India Company, The Original Raiders’ https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/04/east-india-company-original-corporate-raiders

Gelderblom, ‘The Formative Years of the Modern Corporation: The Dutch East India Company’, The Journal of Economic History, Vol. 73, no. 4

Grovogui, ‘Sovereignty in Africa: Quasi-Statehood and Other Myths in International Theory’, Palgrave

Hegel, Lectures on the ‘Philosophy of History’

Krasner, ‘Organized Hypocrisy in Nineteenth Century East Asia’, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Vol 1, Issue 2

Krasner, ‘Organized Hypocrisy’, Chapter 1, ‘Sovereignty and its discontents’, Princeton University Press

Mbembe, ‘Necropolitics’, Public Culture, Vol. 15, no.1, pp11-40

Nobel, ‘Morgenthau’s Struggle with Power: The Theory of Power Politics and the Cold War’, Review of International Studies, Vol. 21, No.1

Osuri, ‘Imperialism, colonialism and sovereignty in the (post)colony: India and Kashmir’, Third World Quarterly, Vol 38, Issue 11

Runciman, ‘Carl Scmitt on Friend vs Enemy’, Talking Politics

Sandbrook, ‘Never Had It So Good’, Chapter 1, ‘Suez’

Strange, ‘The Defective State’, Daedalus, Vol. 124, No. 2

Webster, ‘Business and Empire: A Reassessment of the British Conquest of Burma in 1885’, The Historical Journal, Vol. 43, No. 4