How to save the Union
It would be typical of our times for such a longstanding, deep and meaningful political, social and economic union to be terminated with little more than a pathetic squeal. However, it is depressingly plausible. There is a toxic political combination brewing, one that makes it more likely than not that the Scots can – eventually – get that referendum they’ve been clamouring for. A consistent majority in favour of Scottish independence would seem to suggest that victory for the independence camp is highly probable. So, how should Union-lovers react? Should we give in to a referendum? Can we afford to? Can we afford not to?
In the very short term a second referendum is suicidal. For one, the unionists are likely to lose it. Secondly, holding out has benefits – most obviously, it can curb some of the unionists’ most extreme disadvantages.
The statistics are clear – Scottish Independence seems, at the moment, to be the more popular than the Union. Something like 55% of the voting population support Scottish Independence. Pollsters also seem to underestimate the sort of demographic most keen on independence, the now-notorious long-ignored identity-driven nationalists. It would be dangerous to gamble something so precious on such poor odds.
Brexit and Covid have been politically domineering crises – in Scotland, as in England, both have had widespread ramifications. Brexit underlies Scotland’s relative weakness in decisively determining political affairs. For those Scots whose identity is increasingly framed against the English, the largely English-driven project of Brexit doesn’t square well. The English fascination with British sovereignty, common law and self-determination vis-à-vis the EU just doesn’t seem to make that much sense to Scots. It is a relatively incomprehensible constitutional detour that doesn’ provide many obvious advantages. It is understandable therefore why such a project would breed dissatisfaction and frustration.
The Covid crisis does something different; it provides a glimpse of the sort of reality that may well be possible in the not-too-distant future. In many respects, Scots have seen what something like independence looks like – and most worryingly, they don’t dislike it. A staggering 74% of people think Sturgeon’s dealt with Covid-19 well, relative to a paltry 19% for those who think Johnson has done likewise. In a key way, it has made many of those much-cited practical arguments against independence hard to maintain. Sturgeon’s brutally effective strategy of masking Scotland’s relatively mediocre performance in dealing with the pandemic with a meticulous, down-to-earth image has been hard to tackle – especially in the absence of an especially strong or hostile Scottish media. Those like Douglas Ross have been screaming into the void – with strong and valid criticisms making little inroads.
It would be pretty far-fetched to say that these crises have done anything but hurt the union – however, their legacy is certainly not straightforward. A cooler politics would likely reduce the influence and legacy of both. Once Covid is out of the headlines, it is likely that people won’t make their decisions about governmental competence solely on the back of the apparently better Scottish performance in it. Similarly, Brexit is likely to increasingly become the boring man’s issue - banished to backrooms and bureaucracy, its divisiveness is already dissipating quickly. As our memory of it fades, the practical argument for staying in the union are also likely to become stronger – with accusations of hypocrisy being far less convincing if they relate to a distant, largely forgotten past.
Different sorts of advantages are conferred by a longer political wait. One long-term consequence of Brexit is a permanent de-alignment of Britain from the EU in a way that makes it far less conceivable to be a small flourishing state within it. To give just one example, a border between England and Scotland is going to be far harder to fudge than the one we spent so long wrangling over in Northern Ireland. It is an unavoidable fact we have something qualitatively worse than Northern Ireland – a long, well-integrated land border between two countries that have been joined at the hip for over 300 years.
My advice to Boris Johnson then – do not, I repeat, do not give in to calls for a Second Referendum in 2021 after the Holyrood elections.
Some unionists disagree. These tend to see that it is all but inevitable that a 2021 Holyrood victory would mean a second referendum. The essential justification for such a stance is twofold – one, that it is an undoubtable right for the Scottish to have a referendum, two, it would be practically unwise to refuse one. In my view, both these points miss a lot.
The first point supposes that democracy is the sole mother of all legitimate political decisions. The tendency to imagine democracy as a whole and totalising justification for any thinkable political change is one of the most fatal misnomers of our times. Pure democracy needs to be qualified – other things like stability, rights and constitutional continuity need to be balanced against it to optimise government. Something as potentially sacred and longstanding as the constitutional union between two or more nations therefore cannot be dissolved on a whim. It needs long, careful deliberation and potentially more than a straight majority. The question of ‘what we are’ is a qualitatively different one than ‘what we are to do about a particular short-term problem’. It should be therefore treated with far more caution.
The second prong of the argument – that it would be practically unwise to refuse a second referendum – is also unfounded. The relatively convincing idea that the more that we refuse Sturgeon’s call for a second referendum the higher support for independence will rise is misplaced. There may be some element of this dynamic in certain demographic groups – however, the timing of decisive shifts in opinion on the matter indicate something more complex. As late as early 2020, the unionist camp maintained a clear and unambiguous lead in the polls. In fact, in 2018, polls tended to show the unionists had a lead that exceeded their result in 2014 – exceeding 15% at some points. This indicates that the triumvirate of Boris, Covid and Brexit have temporarily bolstered support for independence. Importantly, this implies that the problem is a short term one – and that some brand of unionism remains potentially convincing to many.
So, the fatalistic argument of an inevitable future pro-Independence surge is not only wrong, it could cause Scottish Independence. The view is history read backwards – interpreting an event resulting from multiple complex factors as originating from one overarching, unstoppable force. If we think like this, we falsely extrapolate from our poor current position that things can only get worse, thereby forcing ourselves to gamble unnecessarily on bad odds.
So why am I so pessimistic if our chances are nevertheless likely to improve with time. Two reasons. The first is that there could be some capitulation to the SNP following its win, giving into demands for the Second Referendum.
The second one is far harder to ignore. It is a dynamic baked into future Parliamentary arithmetic – a hard and unavoidable determining fact in British politics. It is quite likely that the SNP will be part of any future stable Labour government. This means they will be able to force a referendum, whether the major parties wish for one or not.
The nature of First Past the Post (FPTP) means the SNP are likely to win 35 seats or more in a given General Election. The SNP has high, concentrated support and a divided opposition, which tends to be a winning combination at Westminster elections. One popular argument against this claim is that sooner or later, there will be some deus ex machima that will all but eliminate the SNP’s longstanding electoral lead. Some cite Alex Salmond’s likely future attack on Sturgeon, while others point to the SNP’s incompetence in dealing with Scotland’s pressing endemic issues. In my view, it is entirely possible this is just not going to happen. Unlike the Conservatives and Labour in England, the SNP is not competing with other parties primarily in an ideological way. Instead, it both defines itself and its purpose in national and therefore unifying terms. The SNP has managed to pull off a rare feat – it has become the party that embodies what many perceive the values of Scotland to be. Parties like the CSU in Bavaria, the ANC in South Africa and the Christian Democrats in Italy show that this can provide a party consistent and reliable returns to government. This is worrying stuff for unionists.
It will only take one close almost-win from Labour to more or less force the left to fold and grant the Scots a referendum. Unionists need to recognise this as a fact – some time in the next decade and a half there will likely be another referendum. Saving the union will be difficult, but we have time. In this time, there needs to be a comprehensive re-imagining of what it means to be British, one that seems convincing to a good number of Scots. As an older generation is replaced by a more unambiguously nationalist younger set of voters, this will be a difficult battle. We will be fighting against the tide – but the fortunate thing for us is that it is by no means inevitable that it is a battle that we have to lose. There is nothing inevitable about Britishness and Scottishness being mutually exclusive – for over 200 years, Scottishness was an integral element of a shared British identity. A successful marriage needs a kernel of deep emotional familiarity and connection. The British Union is no different.
Yours,
WFF