Charles I – Rating Monarchs

Charles will always be defined by the Civil War and his subsequent execution. In many respects, this instinctively makes it easy for us to paint a picture of him. He is the guy who annoyed enough people that the English felt it necessary to cut short his reign and his life by deposing and executing him. Undoubtedly, this is somewhat true – however, in my view this interpretation underestimates Charles. Charles is a monarch who was transforming Britain in a way that was both necessary and sensible – and was certainly destined not to fail. His one big failure – the loss of control of his Kingdom – was undoubtedly his fault, however, even in the most trying times, Charles displays important cunning and an ability to limit the consequences of his worst decisions.

I rate Charles a 6 out of 10. He is not great, but certainly not the worst King ever.

England’s Problems and Charles’ Big Plan

England had several deep, endemic problems when Charles assumed the throne in 1625. In many respects, it was a Kingdom both out of the way and left behind. It was most of all politically and financially hamstrung. Money was hard to come by for the crown. Parliament very rarely voted for the King to have money – and when it did it was largely inadequate. This is a recurring problem for English monarchs – but it was one that would reach a boiling point in the 17th Century with the Civil War. In Charles’ first four years, he got a brutal lesson about the Crown’s relative international inferiority. Charles engaged in two largely inconsequential wars against the French and Spanish, where Parliamentary subsidies proved insufficient to fund an army that would seriously threaten either of these Catholic enemies. Expeditions to Cadiz in Spain and the Ile de Rhe in France had resulted in decisive defeat for British troops. The British public sphere, who at this moment considered Charles to be still largely acting in British and protestant international interest, blamed the failures on Charles’ protégé and chief noble – George Villiers, Duke of Buckingham. In 1628, Buckingham was assassinated, leading to celebrations across the country. For Charles, his failure and loss of a close friend was both a warning and a lesson. The British state had big problems that needed to be overcome. If he was to achieve anything, he needed to tackle these in a no-nonsense way.

The obvious question was how to go about doing solving these problems. For Charles, the answer lay in abandoning Parliament as an institution. Parliament voted low amounts of money insufficient to achieve the crown’s goals, while at the same time making seemingly unreasonable demands of the monarchy. For example, Parliament regularly demanded monarchs do away with non-Parliamentary forms of raising revenue. They often criticised the government for what were known as ‘royal prerogatives’, i.e. powers that could be exercised by the crown without parliamentary oversight. These made up a significant portion of government revenue – usually the majority in any given year. ‘Royal prerogatives’ included rights to sell monopolies, to collect import taxes and to manage estates of those heirs whose father had died before they had reached 21 – something known as ‘Wardship’. Parliament also held Charles to account in other ways, often putting pressure on him to pursue a strongly protestant foreign policy and religious settlement. Charles, although a protestant, did not like being pushed around. All these factors contributed to the decisive political decision of Charles’ reign. Charles attempted something radical, yet at the same time somewhat commonsensical. Charles attempted to rule without Parliament.

Personal Rule and its Consequences

In many ways, what became known as ‘Personal Rule’ made a lot of sense. In fact, if Charles is to be called a good king, it would be because of his recognition that he needed to be brave in 1629, and to follow through with an ingenious solution to his woes. However, the failure of ‘Personal Rule’ lies in the fact it ended. A unique blend of stubbornness and political incompetence meant Charles’ plan fell through quite spectacularly – in a way that can largely be blamed on Charles.

The spirit of personal rule was raising finance and enforcing Charles’ will irregardless of what the budding public sphere thought. This manifested itself in two ways. Firstly – and most importantly – there was finance. Charles tightened the bolts in regard to money – squeezing all he could from his royal prerogative. Charles resurrected royal prerogatives that had been recognized as largely defunct and outdated. To give an example, Charles revived the Forest laws – which punished those who had infringed on the de jure boundaries of royal forests. Charles also issued fines for ‘restraint of knighthood’, where he fined all those knights earning over £40 who had not turned up to his coronation. This was not all – as well as increasing levies on commonly used revenue raising techniques like import taxes, monopolies and wardship, Charles also extended a tax called ‘Ship Money’. ‘Ship Money’ was a tax used to pay for the navy in times of national crisis. If there was a genuine national crisis, it may have been accepted that this was necessary. However, the threat that Charles I played up was one of piracy – something which may have been a localised problem in the English Channel, but certainly one that did not threaten the body politic. More frustratingly for well-educated literate Englishmen, Charles I extended it to the whole of England – not, as had traditionally been done, the coastal counties.

This being said, the beauty of Charles’ system was that there was very little most people could do about Charles’ refusal to call Parliament. It was unambiguously Charles’ right to do use his royal prerogative in the way he did – even if it was outside the spirit of the law. The ways in which individuals attempted to resist were not in themselves existential threats to the regime. Avoiding paying an unjust tax – as many did - could not bring the system crumbling down. In the end, little could be done and Charles managed to squeeze the financial system very successfully – raising income from £600,000 to £900,000 a year.

Charles also gained a newfound confidence to pursue a foreign and religious policy which far better reflected his beliefs as a King. Firstly, he absented himself from costly wars which often had little benefit for Britain as a whole. Instead of frittering away cash in hopeless wars that the British were bound to lose as a result of their relatively small economic base, Charles remained largely neutral in the 30 Years’ War. This was undoubtedly sensible – most of Europe was devastated or very heavily taxed by the conflict, which the British Isles were almost unique in avoiding. Secondly, Charles pursued a boldly conservative religious policy that increased frustration with his regime among puritans – who constituted the majority of a relatively wealthy public sphere. Largely under the direction and influence of one of Charles’ notorious ministers, and from 1633 the Archbishop of Canterbury – William Laud – Charles brought in increased emphasis on ceremony in religious practise. Examples of what this looked like include the use of Prayer Rails in worship and the introduction of Vestments for ministers.

In both religion and foreign policy, Charles was able to make changes that he wished for, and in many respects, allowed for the necessary concentration of sovereignty in the hands of one director of national affairs. This was very similar to the successful and much-celebrated centralisation of sovereignty by Louis XIV in the latter half of the 17th Century. If Charles had not let his system become unstable and ultimately falter, it is likely he may have held a very similar role in British history as the Sun King has in French history. The dilemma of the emerging state – how to rule effectively when there are particularist pressures chafing at your ability to maximise your resources, was well on the way to being resolved in the person of Charles I. Further prosperity and increasing international trade growth could have permanently made the crown financially independent by – probably - some point in the 1650s. Charles would be able to therefore exercise high degrees of power domestically and internationally. That Charles had a strategy for the problem which repeated English monarchs had put off since the Wars of the Roses, and was brave enough to commit to it fully, means he cannot be too heavily judged for what happened next.

Charles’ Failure

Unfortunately for Charles, it was not to be. The one rule of a system that racked up high degrees of political dissatisfaction in order to maximise England’s financial and political resources was to not let those dissatisfied have power over you. A fatal combination of Charles’ stubbornness, his inability to read the mood of the dissatisfied and poor luck allowed Charles to get outmanoeuvred by a combination of angry Scottish Presbyterians and Parliamentarians.

It all began with an attempt to bring the Scottish Presbyterian church in line with the Anglican one. The ‘Scottish Prayer Book’ of 1636, outlining the specifics of Scottish worship, was incredibly controversial north of the border. For many Scots, it was an imposition too far – attempting to remove all but superficial differences between the Scottish church and the more conservative English one. Most had a strong sense of attachment to their unique Presbyterian system. It therefore makes sense that there was great anger amongst almost all Scots in the Presbyterian lowlands. In 1637, widespread protests broke out, and the following year a ‘National Covenant’ was signed, which made clear the Scottish nobles’ opposition to the King. In many respects, Charles’ obvious defects resulted into this slide into outright opposition. Instead of offering the olive branch to nobles who believed their chances against the full might of the crown was relatively slight – Charles declared all those that opposed him traitors. This made it necessary for the Scots to organise quickly and effectively and closed the door to any negotiation from the outset.

Charles then attempted to crush the Scottish rebels but was slow enough in doing so that the Scots were able to finance a sizeable force against him. The Scots defeated the English in the First Bishops War in 1639. This was unambiguously Charles’ fault - primarily resulting from his dual failures of quick suppression or compromise. In this way, Charles placed himself in a position where he had intractable political opponents north of the border who he believed it was necessary to defeat. Having had his army routed, Charles needed more money to raise another. Here, Charles once again chronically miscalculated.

Parliament

The cure turned out to be far worse than the disease. It is here that once again Charles’ inability to read the public’s mood turned an open wound septic. It is a complicated and largely tangential story explaining exactly why Charles was forced to call Parliament – however, the point is that by November 1640, Parliament had been called.

As with many attempts to undo the authority of the existing regime from the centre, there was a gradual and largely willing handover of several core powers by Charles to Parliament. From November 1640 to December 1641, Charles willingly gave into mostly reasonable demands of Parliament. For example, he guaranteed that Parliament could not be dissolved without its own consent, executed an unpopular minister – the Earl of Strafford – and accepted Parliament’s abolition of several of the most excessive taxes like Ship Money. However, by late 1641, Charles was getting impatient. Parliament refused to grant Charles his much-needed money, and what’s more, radicals within Parliament seemed to be acting to provoke. Charles recognised the danger that radicals like John Pym posed to him. They criticised the King’s policies in Parliament and in an emerging public sphere. Here, Charles shows his subtle blend of strengths and weaknesses clearly. In December 1641, Charles attempted to arrest six of his most hostile critics by entering Parliament mid-debate. This could have been a clever pacifier of the most virulent of his enemies if it succeeded. However, Charles’ poor luck won the day, with the relevant members having been warned about Charles’ plan – and therefore being conspicuously and embarrassingly absent. Instead, his attempt at arresting members of Parliament incensed pro-Parliament mobs, causing him to flee the capital. A potentially effective but ultimately botched attempt at neutralising Parliament sums up Charles’ strengths and weaknesses well. Charles had a knack of gleaming what is politically necessary, but was poor when dealing with people and politics. Aloof, stubborn, yet unwilling to take decisive action – Charles had the appearance of an uncompromising authoritarian, but at the same time regularly failed to act with speed and ruthlessness to make this uncompromising image worthwhile.

Civil War

Charles cut his losses, left the capital and set up camp in Nottingham. Again, this stage of Charles’ reign is another tantalising tale of almosts. For one, Charles’ decision to leave London at the time he did shows his political skill. In the opening phase of the civil war, Charles was able to gain significant amounts of support – outstripping Parliament and giving him an immediate military advantage. Charles’ strategy once again was relatively sensible. By waiting until late 1641 to break with Parliament, Charles had shown he accepted reasonable reforms such as removing Ship Money and having recurrent Parliaments. He had also shown his opponents hands – with a radical few in Parliament voting through relatively extreme and unpopular measures. Charles increasingly became the figurehead of a monarch-led political order that refrained from the worst excesses of Parliament. Supporters of Charles pointed at some of the more outrageous things that Parliament demanded - including the abolition of Bishops and the refusal by Parliament to allow the King to lead an Army against Irish rebels. At the same time, Charles also tapped into more traditional support for the monarchy – those who believed in the divine right of Kings. Charles was nothing if not devoted to what he saw as right – something that had advantages as well as disadvantages.

It was this successful cultivation of a relatively large pro-Charles coalition that allowed Charles to advance on London in 1642. Charles’ army was almost successful in crushing Parliament, having gained a strategic victory at Edgehill in the early phases of the war. However, Charles was once again insufficiently resolute – not pursuing his strategic advantage to the limit, and instead retreating from London in 1642. Here again, Charles fell slightly short. Charles had done so much to recover the dire situation, but his poor skill at reading people and moments had once again doomed potential victory.

Final Years

From 1642 until 1647, things went downhill for Charles – they were likely to given the massive disparity between the economic resources in the Parliamentary controlled South and East of England and royalist controlled North and West. It is not worth dwelling on this too much – Charles’ failures in the civil were the early ones I have already described.

Before we conclude, there is one final episode that shows the strength and limitations of Charles as a political actor. This is the last phase of his reign, after the Civil War, where Charles attempted to negotiate some sort of settlement with the winning coalition of Parliament, the Army and the Scots. It may seem odd to separate each of these parties out, considering that they were only just fighting a war on the same side – however, Charles made the seemingly superficial differences between the winning parties vital. Charles cleverly recognised that he could get a better deal by playing his enemies off against each other. He negotiated with the Scots, the Parliamentarians and the Army and attempted to pry them apart.

In one important respect he succeeded, and his strategy paid dividends – he got better terms in 1648 than he ever got in 1646. In fact, in 1648, the Army offered him very generous ‘Heads of Proposals’ that trusted him to rule without constant Parliamentary oversight, as well as allowing him to maintain a loose episcopacy. However, Charles’ knack for misreading people and politics meant that he once again backed a poor horse at a poor time. He agreed to a proposal negotiated by the Scots who then got routed at the Battle of Preston, fatally undermining trust in the King in the English camp. Long story short, Charles continued to try and play both Parliament and the Army off each other – it is only after 3 years of this that it was deemed an unfortunate necessity to try him. Even when in trial, Charles attempted to call the Army’s bluff – attempting to take the moral high ground and not defend himself against the charges against him. Instead, he rejected the authority of the court wholesale – ideologically watertight, politically catastrophic. It was classic Charles. As it turned out, this proved to be a strategy which immortalised Charles as a martyr for monarchy – however, it is highly unlikely this was the sort of calculation Charles was making. Charles was instead attempting to push the limits of a frustrated military establishment – a military establishment which did not necessarily want Charles dead. In fact, it is likely that it was only Charles’ strident opposition to the court that caused him to lose his head as well as his throne.

Final Remarks

Charles’ reign is a tragedy. In many respects, it is the story of a man who did the right things at the right time – someone with a good sense of long-term political planning – but when it came down to it was peculiarly inept at implementation. Unusually dogmatic and stubborn, Charles lived and breathed an uncompromising vision of monarchy that alienated many. This may not have been a problem if this was not twinned with another characteristic – an inability to read politics and people. At several points where he should have recognised the need to be harsh, decisive and to shut an issue down, he attempted to walk an awkward middle ground that allowed his opponents to see his intentions without actually being able to implement them. This happened again and again. To give a few examples, the fact he failed to compromise with or militarily defeat the Scots, the fact he did not defeat Parliament early on and the fact that he refused to accept an unusually good deal after the Civil War all result from these odd Caroline characteristics. In this way, he is complex, and although not a good King – he is certainly one who does not deserve the label of an aimless authoritarian bound to fail.

Yours,

WFF