Dear all,

Today, I want to bring you another blog post on Italy. This time I will be exploring the nature of what G. M. Trevelyan famously dubbed ‘the turning point at which modern history failed to turn’. This is the 1848 revolutions. I think its important to understand just what the significance of these critical revolutions had generally. My interpretation of his oft-quoted statement is that it contains a lot of truth.

Post-1848 Europe in many respects lay in the shadows of 1848. 1848’s real significance, at least in Italy, was that it is very hard to ignore questions that were previously very easy to turn a blind eye to. A superficially restored European order post-1848 would be one that was nevertheless on thin ice. It was an order that had just experienced the threat of revolutionary upheaval, and could not deny that this sort of revolutionary upheaval could happen again. This part terrified, part entrenched rulers, and as a result, in Italy at least, there were attempts to bargain with the fate of violent upheaval and revolutionary change as well as to repress it.

The revolutions themselves represented a combination of fear of radical change and rural unrest and saw the newly formed ‘Italian’ cultural and political elites become political agents. It is important for us to understand, however, the weakness of these groupings. They were not a recipe for stable or long-lasting political change, and the forces of the pre-1848 order could and did clamp down hard on insurrection. They did so, and as in Trevelyan’s quotation, history as a result failed to ‘turn’. What I will be setting out in detail is the two twin aspects of 1848 in Italy. One, why it failed – in doing so I will be describing why the odds were stacked against it in the first place. Two, why 1848 had such a massive legacy, and still can be justly described as a ‘turning point’, in spite of all its failures.

The Context and The Pressures

Revolutions tend to not appear out of thin air. Usually there are some long-standing pressures common to most revolutions that give a pretty good explanation as to why events happened when they did. 1848 was no different, in fact, Europe-wide revolutions followed a Europe-wide bread crisis. The ‘Hungry Forties’ as they were known were a period of immense struggle, immense hunger and immense socio-economic pressure on the rural and urban poor. Potato famine and rising bread prices combined. In the cities, urban workers could not afford food, or if they could it took a large section of their income. In the countryside, the effect was more direct. Famine and blight meant no food, meant hunger and anger. In 1847, after two bad years of harvests, there were crop failures. Already, a year before the revolutions, this was sufficient to cause rioting and street protest.

The other thing to note was the proliferation of a feeling of liberal-nationalist optimism across the peninsula. A bit of context needs to be given here. In a previous post I have set out exactly what this liberal-nationalism was. I will briefly set it out here for clarity’s sake. Liberals and nationalists in this period generally shared a platform. They both reacted against the semi-feudal order that generally limited power to a select few at the top and used monarchical systems and traditional forms of legitimacy that emphasised hierarchy. Therefore, radicals tended to be nationalist and liberal in character.

The other thing that needs to be noted here is that liberals and nationalists tended to belong to an elite. The composition of this elite, and description of them needs to be set out to understand how they contributed to the 1848 revolutions. The cultural and political elite in Italy in my definition is the groupings of upper middle class and aristocratic men (and they were mostly men) essential to the running of the Italian states. They tended to vary considerably in their views and worldview. However, the point is that unlike the vast majority of the peasantry or embryonic working-class, they were politically aware and politically active. The majority of them at this point were not explicit nationalist liberals. Many, however, were increasingly becoming susceptible to liberal and nationalist ideas. A small sliver of this elite would contribute directly and fervently to the revolution. Some would sympathise with it, some would oppose it, and some would find themselves in an ambivalent position. However, the important thing to note is that there was increasing amounts of both energy and strength in the radical nationalist wing of this elite. The perception among the most radical of the elite, at the very least, was that Italy had suddenly awoken. In some elite quarters there was thus enormous excitement and an optimistic feeling political change was on the way.

The context for this was the election of a new Pope, Pius IX in 1846. Pius IX seemed from the outset to be sending liberal-nationalist signals to the population at large. Many moderate nationalist ‘neo-Guelphs’ had argued that the way to create a united Italy was through co-opting to Pope and making him President of a federative Italy. So when, in 1846-7, Pius seemed to be making liberal reforms, the nationalist cultural elite across the peninsula started to get excited. For example Pius’ reforms included attempts at reforming the judiciary – which had been seen by liberals as unduly harsh. What’s more, in 1847, the three relatively liberal rulers of Tuscany, the Papal States and Piedmont formed a customs union. This sort of change seemed like a first step that states wishing to form a federative Italy would take. As a result of all this, the cultural elite increasingly gained faith in the current rulers of those in Italy. A mood of general optimism that things would slowly move forward to achieve the goals of the national movement became common.

In this way, two things provide the essential context for the 1848 revolutions. The first of which is increasing social and economic pressure. The second is an increasing optimism that Italian unity can probably be achieved through the current state system in a consensual way.

REVOLUTION

The 1848 Revolutions are generally deemed to have started in Sicily in January 1848. The island was part of the ‘Kingdom of Two Sicilies’, alternatively known as the ‘Kingdom of Naples’. A peasant revolt as a result of poor rural conditions caused authorities to lose control in the peninsula early in the month. As is so often the case, the political vacuum created by rural unrest caused calls for political change which the peasantry cared little for. By late January, when similar protests and unrest had taken place in Naples, the King became scared. Instead of resisting tooth-and-nail, he decided to accept the revolutionary demands of the movement. He granted a liberal constitution, one based off the relatively liberal constitution of post-1830 France, and in the mood of optimism, tensions died down and the rural peasantry took rhetoric of change to heart.

A combination of fear and optimism struck the rulers across Italy to act. Out of fear of similar rural revolts, and out of an optimistic sense that change could be effectively managed, rulers acted. It is important to note that to some extent, there were already liberal-nationalist reforms that had been made by the states of Italy. It therefore didn’t seem to much of a leap to go a bit further. It was not out of character and would cash in on the goodwill generated in the last two or three years of liberal reforms. To maintain control in uncertain times, monarchs granted constitutions and payed various degrees of homage to nationalism. In reality, the revolutions were probably to some degree resistible. The liberals and nationalists were weak in number and strength, and although there was a breakdown in law and order, it is not obvious that a ruler should give into this. In many respects, the demands of the peasantry and the demands of the liberals and nationalists were very different, and so a loss of control to the peasantry doesn’t seem to logically mean giving into to the liberal-nationalist radicals’ demands.

If they you, as a ruler, want to respond to the ideological needs and wants and changing conceptions of legitimacy, it should be done in a controlled slow way that builds up trust in the system. Instead what they often opened the door to was to the acceptance that the old system in its entirety was wrong, and needed to be re-established brick-by-brick. Giving power to new conceptions of what was legitimate was fundamentally dangerous to the existing order. This, in many ways, was what the authorities did by allying with the liberal nationalists. They allowed themselves to share power with a new force, one that they unnecessarily allowed to have semi-legal power on the streets. The liberal nationalists became politically and legally acceptable forces, and ones that increasingly controlled capitals of the various Italian statelets. For example, the Pope initiated structural reforms and the Piedmontese King Carlo Alberti granted a liberal Constitution – the Statuto.

Meanwhile, things were hotting up across Europe. Austria, Germany and France all had their own revolutions, and as a result, Italy now was able to escape the previously strong grip of the Austrians. Austria had traditionally – due to its formal and informal control of some states on the peninsula – acted as a reliable friend of monarchy across the peninsula in times of crisis. It had used its large and effectively trained military to put down armed insurrection. However, now, increasingly it was unable to exert power over its own lands. As a result, revolutionaries were able to exert disproportionate influence. Some states were not willing to take the risk of repressing revolutions because their armies seemed insufficient to be effective repressive forces.

In this way, the start of the 1848 revolutions can be best characterised as consisting of an uneasy alliance between existing forces and radicals and revolutionaries. It was one that was brought out of fear of the power of the liberal-nationalist movements, and in only a few cases was there confrontation between the old regime and the revolutionaries. Nevertheless, it was an unstable alliance, and as we will see, slowly fell apart as it became obvious to both sides that the nature of the alliance was contrary to their interests.

Piedmont’s Failure, the Pope’s failure and Austria’s Success

The Savoy dynasty of Piedmont, led by Carlo Alberto, had long had a strong dynastic objective to control the whole of the north of Italy. In 1848, Carlo Alberto smelled an opportunity to achieve these long-standing goals. Austria had formal or informal control of northern Italy during this period. In the absence, therefore, of Austrian force due to the revolutionary activity in Austria’s German and Hungarian lands, Piedmont saw an opportunity to oust it from this region. He did this by using the notion of Italian nationalism to help justify his expansion. In a similar vein to those that accepted liberal constitutions, therefore, he accepted radical ‘nationalism’ but only to further his own interests. In the name of ‘Italy’, Carlo Alberto intervened, using the revolutionary objective to cloak long-standing dynastic ones. Carlo Alberto’s eventual aims were ambiguous. He kept it a secret at the time, and it is relatively likely that Carlo Alberto – who was a relatively ineffective politician – didn’t really know either. He probably wanted some form of either northern Italian Piedmontese-dominated state, or alternatively just taking the province of Lombardy off Austria. He may have settled on a federative Italian state where Piedmont was a major political player and had a greater amount of territory, but we cannot be certain. What is relatively obvious is that he wanted Piedmont to expand, and used nationalism to help both justify it and get other Italian statelets to support him.

Austria, as we have noted, faced its own revolution in March 1848, allowing both Lombardy and Venetia to revolt as it lost the capability to use force to repress them. In both of these provinces, ‘Republics’ were established. Carlo Alberto intervened to support these Republics, and called upon the rest of Italy to help him maintain control.

In true 19th Century Italian style, the war did not go to plan. Logistical errors, the poor military leadership of the King and a lack of clear strategy all combined to make the campaign slow and ineffective. Carlo Alberto’s personal dominance of the cause and the focus on traditional dynastic objectives made the cloak of nationalist legitimacy insufficient to convince many nationalists that this was a nationalist cause. What’s more, those leading other Italian states, under domestic pressure to contribute to the Piedmontese war, made sure that all attempts were lacklustre in character. Some Italian volunteers did contribute to the Piedmontese cause, but even then, the number was small. Some specific condemnations from leaders of the Piedmontese cause, or the cause of nationalism generally contributed. The Pope’s ‘allocation’ – in common parlance a speech - was crucial. This in essence was a condemnation by the Holy See of both the Piedmontese-led war and Italian nationalism more generally. It was the first significant break by the existing forces of Italy with the movements they had co-opted out of fear, and it was a really significant one. Everyone in Italy was a Catholic, even the radicals – Mazzini’s ‘Democrat’ ideology was steeped in a form of Catholicism. The Pope’s condemnation of the war was therefore a big deal, discouraging many from fighting for Piedmont.

Piedmont therefore was at a significant disadvantage. These advantages combined with the fact that the Austrian Army was still strong and that the Austrians had an alliance with the even more powerful Russia meant Piedmont’s control of northern Italy was doomed. There was one more thing that disadvantaged Piedmont that tells us a lot about the nature of this movement generally. This was considerable scepticism even within the rebelling states about the commitment to a Piedmont-led Italy. This reflected the fact that even within a liberal-nationalist revolution on the peninsula there was significant attachment to local regions. In Venetia, for example, where there was a very strong regional identity, the ‘Republic of St. Mark’ refused to be integrated into a Piedmontese-led Italy. In Lombardy and much of north-central Italy, there was considerable scepticism of Piedmont – only the necessity of a better defence convinced these regions to join in a unified Piedmont-led front.

It was therefore no surprise when the Piedmontese project came crumbling down at the Battle of Custoza. This battle, in July 1848, saw a Piedmontese-led army being defeated by an Austrian one. Piedmont would try one more time to establish its dream in 1849, but even more so this time, defeat was a certainty. Austrian force continued to keep the north of the peninsula under tight wrap. However, what is important to note is that the mechanism that would eventually be critical in uniting Italy – a Piedmont that wanted control of Northern Italy and was willing to use the concept of ‘Italy’ to achieve it – was already something being used in 1848.

Meanwhile, in the Papal states, things had turned sour in a different way. This time it was as a result of the increasing incompatibility of the Pope’s position with that of the radicals. The Pope had more or less given informal sanction to the revolutionaries’ political influence on the streets. He had informally legitimised their ideology and made it acceptable to expect new things of the existing regime. When, therefore, the Pope started making more conservative noises, the mechanism to make the Pope feel pressure was present. After making the ‘allocation’ against the Piedmontese campaign, he was already on thin ice with some radicals. He appointed Pellegrino Rossi as a liberal radical Prime Minister who he had some degree of control over. When Rossi was assassinated, the Pope felt his political career – and potentially life – was in danger as a result of the increasing instability in Rome. He fled to the Neapolitan fort-city of Gaeta, and as a result the revolution in Rome became uncontrolled and radical. It is therefore the case that the Pope acted against his real interests by embracing nationalism and liberalism – these were the forces which ousted him from power.

How the Revolution died

The final stage of the 1848 revolutions in Italy, occurring in (confusingly) early 1849, was the most dramatic in terms of imagery, and was certainly more important as a piece of the Risorgiomento canon than anything else. It involved the semi-heroic resistance of Rome from against invading Austrian Army by a radical reforming government in Rome.

The Roman Republic is the key player in this part of 1848. This was, in essence, a so-called ‘Democrat’ (i.e. the radical movement inspired and largely led by Giuseppe Mazzini) led Republic. In fact, Mazzni, the de facto leader of the ‘Democrats’ came to Rome to led the Republic himself. In the absence of the Pope or other traditional forms of authority, anything seemed possible. Mazzini aimed to make this his springboard to unify Italy. Unfortunately for him, all the other Revolutionary movements in Italy spurned his Republic, and the Austrians in the very north of the peninsula looked as if they would restore the Pope to temporal rule in the Papal States whenever they had sufficient strength.

Other ‘Democrats’ across the peninsula also took control in this later period of the revolution. In Tuscany, a Republic led by Giuseppe Montanelli and Francesco Guerazzi took the place of the Habsburg ruler Grand Duke Leopold after he fled, and in Venice Daniele Manin continued one of the longest lasting revolutions on the peninsula. However, after the second defeat of the Piedmontese in April 1849, the days of these various Republics were numbered.

Austria slowly but surely whittled away at the ‘Democrat’ Republics, helping previous authorities re-establish control. There was a degree of certainty that overwhelming Austrian force would eventually re-establish control over the peninsula. The two last dots of resistance to go were Rome and Venice, both fighting to the last, and both ultimately succumbing to Austrian military force.

Paradoxically, however, the notion of struggle in the face of overwhelming odds created a legacy for the 1848 Italian Revolutions which begins to hint at why this was a turning point generally. In Rome, Giuseppe Garibaldi, an Italian nationalist and effective fighter, did not give up when the Austrians took Rome. When Mazzini’s Republic was surrounded and defeated, he and a group of volunteers opted to fight on. They continued to go northwards, slowly falling victim to sickness, disease and attrition until literally only Garibaldi was left. This helped cement the notion of what these Revolutions meant into the minds of both the Italian cultural elite and liberal circles in Western Europe. The notion of ultimate sacrifice in the face of hopelessness was and still is undeniably stirring.

1848 as a Turning Point

Although the 1848 Revolutions were a failure, their importance should not be judged on this failure. More than anything, the revolutions generally were a collective experience for Europe to go through – in Italy especially so. Those who had previously downgraded the significance of the threat of liberalism and nationalism thought their previous selves to be deceived. It was now not merely possible to think in terms of liberalism and nationalism, it became central to one’s worldview. To an extent it created the groundwork for a split between reactionary, conservative governments and liberal governments that tried to maintain a balance between the old order and progress. Italy was scarred by the experience of yielding to new ways of thinking about political legitimacy. The Pope had sought to find a middle ground between the old and new systems, but instead had been practically ousted by the forces he unleashed. The same is true across Italy – increasingly reaction that had not been seen in the Restoration period of 1815-1848 became commonplace as regimes reacted to their previous collapse at the hands of radicals.

This had consequences for the stability of the regimes across the peninsula. Increasingly, they became brittle and unloved. The connection between the cultural and political elites and the states themselves became weaker as reaction ensued. This is not to say that everyone instantly became an Italian Nationalist – no, on the contrary, Italian nationalism remained relatively weak. Instead, the mechanisms of informal and implicit consent within monarchies throughout the peninsula started to become weaker. The cultural and political elites tended to still think in relation to their regional state unit, but they increasingly had a sense that there were problems within it that needed solutions. This would be fertile ground for thinking about new types of political order.

The lessons and significance of 1848 as a turning point do not end here. 1848, it should be remembered, was also a failure for the nationalists. Nationalists gained two things from the revolutiona. The first was a lesson. Mazzini’s brand of optimistic utopian Christian revolutionary nationalism, which many were already sceptical about, was deemed to be too optimistic by many. 1848 had showed that Italy would not erupt in revolution instantaneously as prophesised by Mazzini’s ideas. Instead, increasingly, nationalists would look to more pragmatic methods to achieve their nationalist ideas. This was not immediate, and Mazzini’s stock actually increased in the immediate aftermath of the 1848 revolutions due to his prominence in it, but it would certainly lead to a change in tactics. In particular, a focus on Piedmont, especially through the pressure group the ‘Italian National Society’, would increasingly be the main thrust of the nationalist movement.

The second thing that the nationalists would gain from 1848 was a spectacular moment that would allow movement to gain in relevance and popularity. The nationalists had previously found it hard to create a convincing Italian-wide historical narrative. The gift of 1848, with its notions of immense, intense struggle, its strong imagery of blood and its heroes – those like Manin, Garibaldi and Mazzini – was therefore not insignificant. For example, Garibaldi’s desire to fight to the very last man was seen across Italy as an exemplary image and description of what nationalism was in essence about. People began to think that at the very least this was a narrative of history, which brought significant political baggage with it, that could not be ignored. How could it be ignored? It had just been the exciting political reality for 18 months. It had penetrated even as far as the notoriously difficult to penetrate peasant consciousness, evidenced by the fact that by 1860, Garibaldi was seen as a peasant hero. Of course, again, this should not be exaggerated, and the influence of 1848 as an event was mainly among the politically active. However, the massive significance of 1848 as a political, socio-economic and cultural event made people think about change in relation to it, and increasingly on an Italian scale.

Conclusions

1848, was I am certain, a revolution that both showed and changed many things about mid-19th Century Italy. It was the crux around which things turned and an event that sticks out in the chronology of the Risorgiomento. More than anything, it operated at the edge of the possible, and by doing so made new things conceivable. Many actors acted unnecessarily and against their better interests. The fear of revolution was often worse than their potential threat. Weak, limited movements were given a helpful leg-up by fear combined with a temporary absence of the Austrian military authority.

As a result, the realm of possible was increased significantly. The threat and potential of nationalism as a force became perceived as far bigger than it was before 1848. It became something that increasingly people began to think in relation to far more than before 1848. This, as we will see, had really significant consequences in the period 1848-1860. The political atmosphere completely changed, and increasingly the structures that had acted as such good preventatives for reform slowly but surely fell apart.

Yours,

WFF